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1 
Toward the Institutional IntegratioD: of 
the Core Human Rights Treaties. 
CRAIG SCOTT 
By its nature as a pronouncement of high normative principles, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) did not address the hard ques-
tions related to the creation of institutions to begin the process of bridging 
Lhe gap between statement of ideals and practical realization. However, 
starting with the grand bifurcation that produced the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as the two insti-
tutionally separated offspring of the UDHR, the UN human rights treaty 
order has evolved in such a way that the UDHR's inclusion of the entire 
range of then-recognized human rights in one authoritative instrument has 
become fragmented. We now have six core conventions each with its own 
treaty body charged with interpreting and rnonitoring compliance with its 
own instrument.1 This chapter builds on works that seek to make a case for a 
much less category-bound approach to thinking about human rights.2 The 
theme which unites these works with the present chapter is the need for a 
conscious and radical breaking down of the normative boundaries among 
the categories framed by each of the human rights treaties and for a comple-
mentary "interactive reformation" of the treaties' institutional orders in 
order lo harness the benefits achievable through dialogue across diverse 
perspectives in the juridical construction of human rights knowledge. 
The argument in the first work, "Reaching Beyond," was that we must 
strive lo make the original promise of the UDHR- that its human rights 
represent an integrated bundle of fundamental interests-the overarching 
premise of the current six-treaty order. An analytical shift is required to 
enable us to search out ways to approach received categories (economic, 
social, and cultural rights, women's rights, and so on) with a certain wariness 
of the aptness of those categories and with an associated willingness to cross 
to and fro among categories. We must further be prepared to engage in 
category crossing-and caLeg·ory combining- to the point that we begin to 
defy the categories themselves by developing our shared sense of when it is 
awkward, usually unhelpful, and often even harmful to understand a given 
rights claim or context in terms of existing categories. IIarm is exacerbated 
when we approach a right's content as involving only a single category of 
rights as contained in the one treaty that is subject to interpretation or 
application. 3 
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In the second work, "Bodies of Knowledge," the context was set by recent 
recommendations that consolidation of the six treaty bodies into one or two 
bodies should be on the UN reform agenda. It was argued that harnessing of 
diversity must be central to any consolidation reforms and that diversity-
enhancing initiatives must start immediately with respect to the current six-
committee order, in part because practical experimentation with promoting 
diversity will provide valuable lessons at the institutional design stages of 
any eventual consolidation project. But the central thrust of the argument 
was that such an approach was independently desirable quite apart from 
whether treaty-body consolidation is in the cards. Two premises were - and 
remain - central. The first is that superior collective judgment is exercised 
when multiple perspectives are encouraged to interact with each other in 
coming to grips with any given normative issue or decision. The second is 
that, in order for diverse perspectives and actors to interact, there must first 
be a commitrnent to ensuring diversity within the composition of the mem-
bership of collective decision-making bodies. Diversity multiplies perspec-
tives, while the need for decision making necessitates that those perspectives 
engage each other. Diversity helps oust monological reasoning in favor of 
dialogical reasoning, making it less likely lhat reasoning will take place 
within the four corners of a single person's limited knowledge and more 
likely that it will take place in the context of the necessity to test one's 
assumptions and intuitions against those of others. The operative good of a 
"dialogical universalism" is knowledge and the perspectives that adhere to 
knowledge. In somewhat oversimp lified terms, we can th ink of "social expe-
rience" and "disciplinary expertise" as the two main forms of knowledge 
relevant to the juridical construction of normative knowledge.4 
"Bodies of Knowledge" noted but bracketed a third form of diversity of 
knowledge in the human rights treaty context which fuses diversities of 
expertise and experience, namely, diversity of "normative focus." This term 
was meant to capture the epistemological perspectives that tend to coalesce 
a.round a category of human rights as it gets constructed over time as its own 
distinct field of knowledge. In this way, we can speak metaphorically, but 
meaningfully, about the potential of treaty texts to enter into dialogues with 
one another, dialogues that profit from the interaction of the diverse knowl-
edge(s) each treaty regime has constructed for itself. The present chapter 
was signaled by the following passage at the end of the introduction in 
"Bodies of Knowledge": 
[A.] second proposal ... could complement [Lhe discussion in "Bodies of Knowl-
edg·e" J. This is for the human rights committees, through pragmatic acts of institu-
tional co-operation, to consider their six treaties as interconnected parts of a single 
human rights "constitution" and thereby to consider themselves as partner cham-
bers within a consolidating supervisory institution. Through such acts of pragmatic 
imagination, each committee would be encouraged to place itself within a network 
of dialogue with lhe other committees; all would seek to expand their horizons 
. \ 
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through harnessing the pool of djverse knowledge represented by their large collec-
tive membership and the diversity of normative mandates of the six treaties.5 
' The operative assumption of this passage is that, if ~iversity is seen as an 
institutional good because of its role in bringing to bear multiple angles of 
vision on the exercise of judgrnent, then it makes sense lo look at the treaty 
body order as a whole and ask whether knowledge-enhancing effects can be 
achieved by reforming the relations of the committees among themselves. It 
becomes important to think in terms of the normative focus of each com-
mittee's constitutive treaty as having only a partial perspective on human 
rights which would be enhanced by dialogical engagement with the other 
committees.6 Such dialogical congress can be organized in terms of at least 
two broad patterns of interaction. 
If, for some purposes or in some contexts, the committees began to inter-
act as a kind of quasi-consolidated committee of the whole, then this would 
have the effect not only of increasing the overall membership pool (to 97) 
but also of deepening the pool of knowledge. An analysis that is fuller and 
normatively richer can - or, can potentially- be achieved than is possible 
from within a single committee with its more limited membership and its 
more narrowly categorized normative focus. Here, the treaty bodies (or 
cross-cutting working groups made up of several members from each treaty 
body) would interact as some kind of organic or seamless whole, consoli-
dated around a common purpose to the point that the boundaries between 
the institutions functionally dissolve, even if only temporarily and for lim-
ited purposes. So, for example, if the six human rights committees were to 
meet for two days in a joint plenary session to discuss the draft text of a 
common general comment on the relationship of social vulnerability to 
human rights violations, we would speak of the committees (and their mem-
bers) as consolidated for this purpose.7 
In other contexts there may not be any actual convening of the members 
of the committees into some kind of committee of the whole, but rather a 
more notional or virtual dialogue in which each committee takes note of 
procedural and substantive developments (some routine and some more 
experimen tal) that have taken place in other committees and then makes 
an independent choice as to whether to emulate what is going on in the 
other committee (s). On this approach, we would think less in terms of (the 
members of) the committees interacting as a single consolidated collcctiviLy 
and more in terms of the committees in teract.ing as autonomous bodies with 
their own institutional perspectives. Such inter-treaty interaction would be 
premised on institutional sovereignty (both of jurisdiction and of normative 
focus) remaining intact in a strong sense. Th e interaction that takes p lace is 
in the form of dialogue across palpable boundaries in which each institution 
seeks either to persuade or to learn from another institution. Each institu-
tion has its separate perspective generated by its normative focus and by its 
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practical experience which it may wish to commend to the other institu-
tion (s) or to have enriched by listening to the other institution's perspec-
tives and experience. Jurisdictionally separate institutions are engaging in 
dialogue (as an inter-institutional order), not the membership of the institu-
tions as an amalgamated whole (a pan-institutional order). 
The first two sections of this chapter discuss various basic possibilities as to 
how such institutional integration could evolve in the near future. The final 
section then offers some thoughts on what spin-off benefits might be pro-
duced by such integration for resituating "economic, social, and cultural 
rights" in the process of responding to the next generation of monitoring 
chaJlenges in the rapidly evolving context of economic globalization and 
transnational reconfigurations in governance structures. 
The Role of the Annual Meeting of the Ch airpersons in Fostering Evolution 
of the H uman Righ ts Treaties' Integrated Jurisdictional 0 1·der 
P1cruRrNG THE Six-TREATY SYST11£M 
A stylized (bordering on caricatured) depiction of the contrast between the 
state of the current UN human rights treaty order and the as-yet-unrealized 
potential of institutional integration can be found in Figures 1 and 2. In 
both diagrams the six treaties are depicted as circles (A-F). Each circle 
overlaps with the other circles to varying degrees so as to represent the unity 
of purpose and the shared norms of the treaties as well as the potential for 
integrated normative analysis to defy the definitional categories of the rights 
in each treaty. The combined treaty order is shown as embedded in a larger 
UN human rights system that surrounds the treaties in a cocoon of moral, 
political, and legal norms. The United Nations Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights arc the energy sources for this field. Each 
treaty has provisions establishing and setting out the authority of its moni-
toring institution. These provisions are represented as smaller circles lo-
cated so as to portray each of the six human rig·hts treaty bodies incor-
porated within its own treaty's normative world. It is with respect to the 
location of each committee and associated relations with the other commit-
tees that Figures I and 2 differ. 
In Figure 1 (the current treaty order), each committee is shown as lying 
outside the field of normative overlap. This is suggestive, to an exaggerated 
extent, of the way each committee has tended to treat its treaty as a self-
contained regime relatively unconnected to the other five treaties. Each 
committee's location on the far edge of each treaty is also suggestive of 
both its distance from the area of greatest normative overlap (the normative 
core of the treaty order) and its isolation from the other committees. Six 
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much smaller circles in that area of overlap represent the exception to this 
Figure 1 state of affairs. These circles represent the chairpersons of the six 
committees who, as will be discussed in upcoming sections, have been inter-
acting periodically. Except for the occasional individual committee member 
who may use one or more other treaties as some kind of interactive refer-
ence point in the interpretation of her or his own treaty, it is only the chair-
persons who currently have the opportunity to participate in a structured 
pan-institutional context that allows them to view the shared norms of the 
treaties as fertile ground which is ready for careful cultivation. In contrast, for 
many of the other members of each committee, this same ground is more 
likely to be seen as akin to a wild thicket covered in a tangle of branches and 
thorns- an area to avoid rather than cultivate. 
Figure 2 (the potential treaty order) is the diametric opposite to Figure 1. 
Here, interactive diversity of knowledge is harnessed by mapping institu-
tional arrangements onto the area of greatest normative synergy among the 
treaties. Not only the chairs (periodically) but also the committees (con-
stantly) interact in such a way that their combined institutional order takes 
on a shifting amorphous shape. The committees are no longer distinct or 
disk-:tnt circles, although the rounded outer curves of this new body are 
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Figure 2. Potential (de facto consolidated) core treaty 
order. 
meant to suggest a certain retention by each committee of considerable 
ongoing institutional autonomy and of a certain possibility that a given 
committee can always dislodge (or threaten to dislodge) itself from this 
consolidated institutional structure if it becomes dissatisfied with how its 
treaty mandate has fared as a result of the incorporation. 
As of 2000, the actual situation has evolved to some point between Figures 
1 and 2. A certain, albeit embryonic, institutional integration of the treaty 
bodies has begun to occur. Much of the cooperation is inter-institutional in 
nature, taking the form of sharing of information and also of tacit emula-
tion, whereby one committee pioneers a procedural innovation and others 
begin to follow suit.8 This is of course testimony to the fact that jurisdictional 
diversity combined with jurisdictional autonomy can foster productive ex-
perimentation, something that would be severely hampered by total consol-
idation of all six existing committees into one committee.9 At least one 
committee, CEDAW, has designated committee members to be in charge of 
liaising with the other committees, one committee member for each other 
treaty. 10 However, there are nascent, albeit fitful, signs of the possible emer-
gence of an pan-institutional order, to which we now turn. 
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THE ROLE OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CHAIRPERSONS 
The most important form of institutional cooper~tion among the six hu-
man rights Lreaty bodies is the now annual m~eting of the six commiuec 
chairpersons. It may be viewed as a forum pushing to become an institulion, 
representing a kind of hybrid of lhc Lwo forms of institutional interaction 
described above, the inler-institutional and the pan-institutional. The chair-
persons first began meeting in 1984, meeting periodically thereafter until 
the institution of yearly meetings in 1994.u With each subsequent meeting, 
the range of other significant actors who attend or make presentations to 
the chairpersons has grown,12 to Lhc point that some of the more powerful 
NGOs have not only attended bul h ave also been permitted to make oral 
presentations to the chairpersons.rn The meeting's Internet-accessible re-
ports to the General Assembly, along with follow-up reports produced by the 
UN human rights secretariat in response to recommendations of the pre-
vious year's meeting, provide helpful overviews of recent developments in 
the insLitutional practices of each of the treaty bodies. The chairpersons' 
reports, especially those up to the end of 1998, contain many specific recom-
mendations directed to all of the committees, mostly recommendations for 
procedural reform.14 There are as many, if not more, recommendations 
directed to other actors within the system, most notably to the UN human 
rights bureaucracy.rn The annual meeting is clearly starting to play a kind of 
clearinghouse role whereby developments and suggestions from each com-
mittee are conveyed by that committee's chairperson to the chairpersons of 
the other five committees, and then the chairpersons acting as a collectivity 
feed the most meritorious and/ or timely ones back to the committees by 
way of their annual report. The method by which the chairp ersons address 
the committees varies, taking the form sometimes of simple descriptions of 
what various committees are doing and sometimes, more ambitiously, of 
joint recommendations. ' 6 
By and large, the chairpersons h ave concentrated until quite recen tly 
mostly on procedural and resource issues of common interest to th e com-
mittees and have not tended to use their meetings as an occasion for sub-
stantive normative cooperation. On occasion, however, they have taken a 
common normative position on matters of substantive law. At least four of 
these have related to difficult issues of general treaty law: reservations, suc-
cession, denunciation, and in terpretively implied powers. 
On the question of permissibility and the effects of reservations, solidari ty 
among the committees was demonstrated b y th e chairpersons' support for 
the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 24 on reservations.17 
This united front is bound to make it easier for the Human Righ ts Commit-
tee to maintain a strong position on reservations in lhe face of resistance 
from stales like the United States, France, and the United Kingdom who 
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have submitted critical comments on the HRC's reasoning in that general 
comment. 18 
On the question of state succession to human r ights treaties, the chairper-
sons at their fifth meeting, in 1994, "expressed the view that successor States 
are automatically bound by obligations under international human rights 
instruments from the dates of their independence and that respect of their 
obligations should not depend on a declaration of confirmation."19 A year 
later the Human Rights Committee may well have drawn suppor t from this 
statement when it took the view in i ts concluding observations on the report 
of the United Kingdom relating to Hong Kong that human righ.ts treaty 
obligations devolved with territory such that China would be boun d to re-
spect the ICCPR after its takeover of Hong Kong.20 
On th e question of the power to withdraw from human rights treaties, the 
chairpersons in September 1997 stated their view that a state party cannot 
withdraw from the ICCPR, a response to the announcement only th ree 
weeks earlier by North Korea that it intended to denounce the ICCPR.21 
This view was actually stated before the Human Rights Committee itself had 
had an opportunity to discuss and then pronounce on the subject, which it 
did two months later in the form of General Comment 26.22 It is also signifi-
cant from the perspective of the gradual evolution of the interpretive au-
thority of the Chairpersons thal their collective view on denunciation ap-
plies not only to the ICCPR but also to the two other treaties which, like the 
ICCPR, do not con tain clauses expressly permitting denunciation, namely 
the ICESCR and CEDAW. 
Finally, on the question of implied powers, the chairpersons have articu-
lated what will probably turn out to be the most significant of their series 
of views on general treaty law. T he specific issue that the Chairpersons 
were considering was, on the surface, the legal jurisdiction of any of the 
committees to consider the hum an r ights si tuation of a state when that state 
has failed to submit a state report. Two committees, the CESCR and CERD, 
had adopted a practice of considering situations in states whose state report 
is long overdue "once all alternative approaches have been exhausted."23 
T his is one of the best examples of the benefits of jurisdictional experi-
mentalism within the human rights treaty order in that both th e UN Com-
mission on Human Rights and the General Assembly had come to endorse 
these two committees' initiative. Despite such high level political support 
within the UN, a number of states (and, it seems, some committee mem-
ber.s in oth er committees) had begun to question whether such an ap-
proach "might exceed th e legal competence of a committee. "24 This was the 
context in which the chairpersons weighed in with their view on whether 
each committee could examine the situation of a state in the absence of a 
report. The analysis is quite detailed (relative to the usual style found in 
the chairpersons' reports) and, on the whole, leans heavily toward the view 
that the practice is within the competence of the committees.25 However, 
Institutional Integration of the Core Treaties 15 
the significance of the chairpersons' reasoning lies not in their conclu-
, · sion on the specific interpretive issue (examining states who h ave not re-
\ ported) but rather in the general statement of th<:; principles of fr1terpre-
tation that should be applied to resolve claims to implied jurisdictional 
powers made by the treaty bodies. The chairpersons' reasoning is poten-
tially transformative in that not only does it lay the basis for the evolution 
of the jurisdictional powers of each committee, but also it points to the 
legal basis on which a pan-treaty "constitutional" order could itself institu-
tionally evolve: 
The principle which should .. . be applied in responding to a situation which 
threatened to undermine the entire system for supervising the obligations freely 
undertaken by States Parties by virtue of their ratification or accession to the relevant 
treaty was that of ensuring the effectiveness of the regime established by the treaty. 
In the absence of any provision to the contrary in a treaty, the question was whether 
or not a particular course of action contributed to the effectiveness of that regime. 
That approach was analogous to the principle ofimplied powers, according to which 
the acceptability of activities not explicitly provided for should be determined in 
light of the object and purpose of the treaty in question. The International Court of 
Justice has also noted that, even in the absence of specific enabling powers, an 
international body may act in ways not specifically forbidden, in order to achieve its 
purposes and objectives.26 
As a legal theory of the interpretive acquisition of jurisdictional powers, the 
above-stated principles will not take root in a vacuum. Parallel processes of 
political recognition of any powers the committees claim for themselves will 
operate in tandem with the more forensic processes of interpretation that 
produce the claims. Yet, in this one tight paragraph, it may not be an exag-
geration to say that the chairpersons have sown the seeds for the institu-
tional evolution of an integrated human rights treaty order. 
FROM STRUCTURE TO SUBSTANCE: FOSTERING INTEGRATED 
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
The just-given examples dealing with the intersection of general treaty law 
and the evolution of the human rights committees' jurisdictional compe-
tence constitute very significant examples of cross-committee coordination. 
However, with respect to matters of substantive content of human rights 
guarantees (as opposed to structural treaty law issues) , the chairpersons' 
contribution has, to date, been considerably less far-reaching. The area of 
"integration of gender perspectives" represents, so far, the major substan-
tive foray of the chairpersons, being the subject of detailed recommenda-
tions by the chairpersons in 1995, repeated in 1996 and embellished in 
1997. In 1995, the chairpersons endorsed the output of an expert group 
meeting on women's rights, including that meeting's lead recommenda-
tion, which read as follows: 
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The treaty bodies shall fully integrate gender perspectives into their presessional and 
sessional working methods, including identification of issues and preparation of 
quesLions for country reviews, general comments, general recommendatfons, and 
concluding observations. In partkular, the treaty bodies should consider the gender 
implications of each issue discussed under each of the articles of the respective 
instruments.27 
The endorsement in the 1995 chairpersons' report seemed to produce 
some effects within both the conventional human rights order and the 
nonconventional order.28 In 1996 the UN Commission on Human Rights 
adopted a resolution welcoming the chairpersons' recommendation and 
went on itself to recommend to all the treaty bodies that their reporting 
guidelines should be amended to reflect a greater emphasis on gender-
specific information.29 During their separate sessions that same year, three 
committees- the CESCR, CERD, and CRC- signaled that gender perspec-
tives would be a central feature in contemplated revisions of their existing 
reporting guidelines for state reports.30 One committee, the Human Rights 
Committee, announced that it would revise its general comment on article 3 
of the ICCPR which deals with discrimination against women.31 Finally, the 
secretariat for CEDAW, the Division for the Advancement of Women, "be-
gan to develop a methodology by which the treaty bodies 1night systema6-
cally and routinely incorporate a gender perspective in monitoring the 
implementation of the specific provisions contained in the international 
human rights instruments."32 Prior to the chairpersons' 1997 meeting, the 
secretariat's follow-up report to the 1996 meeting took its cue from the 
chairpersons to assert that "the equal enjoyment by men and women of all 
human rights is an overarching principle of the six principal human rights 
treaties" and to suggest that the chairpersons "may wish to consider inviting 
an interested organiz;ation to convene a round-table or expert meeting to 
assist with the drafting of general comments on gender equality. "'~3 At their 
ensuing meeting, the chairpersons discussed whether another expert meet-
ing such as the one whose conclusions the chairpersons adopted in 1995 
and 1996 was desirable. The result of their discussion was an invitation to 
"the relevant United Nations agencies and secretariats to consider the orga-
nization of another such meeting. "M Meanwhile, another roundtable had 
already taken place in the preceding year, organized by the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) on the theme of human rights approaches to 
women's health. The chairpersons used this round table as a springboard for 
recommending both that "a gender dimension be incorporated in the revi-
si9n [by each committee] of general comments/recommendations and 
[state reporting] guidelines" and that the treaty bodies "consider issuing 
general recommendations on health. "35 While the chairpersons drew spe-
cial attention to sexual and reproductive health, their recommendation that 
health (in general) could be the subject of general comments by all the 
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committees is an important addition to gender as a cross-cutting normative 
dimension of all six human rights treaties. 36 
. THE CHAIRPERSONS AS A COORDINATING AND CATALYZING BODY 
It would seem apparent enough that the meeting of the chairpersons is 
slowly developing and pushing for a role as the coordinating, and to some 
extent catalyzing, mechanism for the institutional integration of relations 
among the committees. A good example of the chairpersons serving as 
institutional catalyst, in a way that combines attention to common substan-
tive concerns and the development of its implied jurisdiction, is the follow-
ing 1995 recommendation regarding the need for a pan-treaty approach to 
responding to gross violations of human rights: 
The chairpersons encourage treaty bodies to continue their efforts to develop mech-
anisms for the prevention of gross human rights vjolations, including early warning 
and urgent procedures. They consider that coordinated action by the human rights 
treaty bodies in this regard would increase their effectiveness. To this end, they 
suggest that any action undertaken by one of the treaty bodies be immediately 
brought to the attention of the other treaty bodies.37 
With respect to some of the suggestions (see below) on how consolidation 
might proceed so as to enhance a diversity-based dialogue, it would seem 
· desirable that the chairpersons act as the institutional hub of the process of 
consolidation in tandem with whatever political support from the UN politi-
cal bodies and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights seems appro-
priate or necessary to secure. The chairpersons have themselves spoken of 
their role in terms that hint at this function. In the context of discussing 
reform of the UN human rights treaty system, they spoke of the need to take 
advantage of "opportunities to promote continuing reform of the working 
methods of the different committees," ending with the following succinct 
observation about their own role: "The chairpersons believed that, meeting 
together, they could play a part in the process of reform. While ensuring 
that proper account was always taken of the features specific to each of the 
six treaty bodies, they could identify problems common to different treaty 
bodies and help them coordinate their responses. "38 
Such a relatively minimal role for the chairpersons is consistent with what 
appears to be, at present, a lack of support for de jure consolidation of the 
treaty bodies into one committee.39 It is also consistent with the kind of 
process of institutional integration that amounts to a gradual, experimental 
de facto quasi-consolidation - the subject of this chapter. 
Related to the development of the chairpersons' capacity to serve as an 
institutional hub for the human rights treaties is the chairpersons' repeated 
recommendation, beginning with their 1994 report, to the General Assem-
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bly that some "sui generis staLUs'' be established for the treaty bodies so that 
the bodies could interact with the rest of the UN system in a more official 
capacity.40 Although this request seems primarily intended to allow each 
treaty body to act independently under the mantle of such status, it would 
seem just as important from the perspective of integrated institutionalism 
for the treaty bodies as a collective whole, represented by the chairpersons, 
to be recognized as having a functional status. Given that it is the meeting of 
the chairpersons that has begun to take up cudgels on behalf of the treaty 
bodies as a whole, some recognition needs to be accorded to their meeting 
as the primary agent in the external relations· of the committees.41 By creat-
ing this role in external relations, a dynamic toward enhancing internal 
cooperation and normative cohesion would thereby also be created. To 
accomplish this goal, however, some attention arguably needs to be paid to 
the politics of language. In that regard, the purpose of the next two para-
graphs in this subsection is to advance the rather impertinent suggestion 
that we should consider alternative ways in which to refer to the annual 
meeting of the chairpersons. This question of the title for the chairpersons' 
collective must first be situated in the context of the disparity in the official 
titles as between five of the six treaty bodies and one of them. 
This chapter has been using the terms "human rights treaty bodies" and 
"human right.s commiltees" interchangeably. This is deliberate, motivated 
by a conviction that a politics of language is an important way to help dis-
lodge systemic biases. 42 This concern extends to the subliminal associations 
generated by institutional appropriation of the term "human rights. "43 In 
particular, it has long been a problem that the treaty body overseeing the 
ICCPR was vested by that treaty with the name "Human Rights Committee" 
while each of the other committees have been given names that simply track 
the focus in their treaty's title on the set of rights found in that treaty-the 
"Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights," the "Committee 
Against Torture" and so on.44 There is thus good cause for certain symbolic 
acts in the realm of language that would try to counteract this linguistic 
covering of the field by the Human Rights Committee. One option would be 
to convey to the world at large that, within the current (undesirable) frag-
mented logic of the multiple treaty system, the "Human Rights Committee" 
is actually the "Civil and Political Rights Committee." In this somewhat 
subversive way, we would thereby be trying to encourage a practice of refer-
ring to the six human rights committees in terms that suggest the unity of 
purpose of the six treaties taken as a systemic whole and th eir shared claim to 
be the institutional guardians of human rights. Jn so doing, the under-
inclusiveness of the Human Rights Committee's own "civil and political 
rights" mandate in relation to its imperial name (at least that mandate as 
the Human Rights Committee currently interprets it) would be perceived 
more clearly."5 
In a similar vein, it is worth noting that the politics of language-
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UN-style - seems to have resulted so far in a second class, "lower case" status 
for the chairpersons' forum. Reports to the General Assembly, the agendas 
that precede the meetings, and other documents.ourrently refer simply to 
"the persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies;" In view of this prac-
tice, the chairpersons might wish to consider pushing the linguistic enve-
lope a bit by referring to themselves in a more symbolica11y assertive way. At 
minimum, the annual meeting could be self-styled in capitals as the "Annual 
Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies," which-
ever case the UN bureaucracy chooses to use. An even bolder styling could 
be "Annual Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Commit-
tees." Perhaps the most radical, but most justified, de facto reform would be 
for each committee to give its blessing to constituting-linguistically-an 
overarching body, the name of which would convey the dual idea of inte-
grated normative mandate and cooperative institutional action. Once con-
. stituted by collective recognition of the six treaty bodies, the chairpersons 
could then begin to seek (implicit and eventually explicit) general recogni-
tion by states and the rest of the UN system. The chairpersons' forum (en-
compassing its annual meeting and its inter-meeting activities) could in this 
way metamorphose into something like the "Coordinating Council of the 
Human Rights Committees" or the "Council of Chairpersons of the Human 
Rights Committees" - on either score, the CCHRC. 
All this being said, there are reasons to be pessimistic about the likelihood 
that the chairpersons will evolve to any great extent in this direction without 
. a change in outlook in several quarters. Quite apart from the lack of enthusi-
··. asm of some of the chairpersons, any move toward consolidation in the near 
future is likely to be politically resisted, for reasons that include the opposi-
tion of some states to the promotion of more effective UN human rights 
structures as well as legalistic concerns about treating the six treaties as an 
"objective" legal order (even an evolving one) in a situation where some 
states have ratified fewer than all six treaties. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that, while the Commission on Human Rights did respond favorably 
to the chafrpersons' recommendation on cross-treaty integration of gender 
. perspectives, it also added the caveat that "the enjoyment of the human 
rights of women should be closely monitored by each treaty body within the 
cornpetence of its mandate. "46 This passage can easily be read as a shot across 
the bows of the committees. 47 
But pessimism is not fate. Despite the rather sober thoughts in the preced-
ing paragraph, what follows will assume that the chairpersons can come to 
assume a role as the hub of institutional reform of the treaty body order. The 
following proposals, then, assume the proactive involvement of the chair-
persons. In tandem with the evolution of the chairpersons as a coordinating 
and catalyzing institution, a number of avenues ofintercommittee dialogical 
engagement will begin to open up. The following brief discussions of some 
of the more obvious possible initiatives should not be taken as anything but a 
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preliminary endorsement of the merits of any given possibility. Most signifi-
cantly, the merits of one proposal cannot be assessed in isolation from the 
other proposals. No claim is being made, at this stage, of the degree of 
compatibility inter se of the various proposals. The purpose of what follows is 
merely to put them on the table as candidates for consideration. 
Pan-Institutional Dialogue: Further Basic Experiments in 
Institutional Design 
PUSHING FOR UNIVERSAL RATIFICATION AS A COMPLEMENTARY REFORM 
A central recommendation of a 1997 report to the UN on enhancing the 
long-term effectiveness of the UN human rights treaty system is that the goal 
of achieving universal ratification of all six core treaties should be pursued 
with renewed seriousness and vigor.48 In this respect, the report was follow-
ing up on an earlier recommendation in a 1993 report to make the advent of 
the millennium the target date for universal ratification.49 The chairpersons 
have also been vigorous in endorsing the need for treating universal ratifica-
tion as a priority for the future treaty system, most recently having referred 
to universal ratification of the six treaties as "an essential dimension of a 
global order."50 This phrasing suggests some awareness that a fully "objec-
tive" legal order, which as such would be able to lay claim to a status in the 
world normative order akin to a constitution, is in constant tension with 
each state's consent to be bound as the prevailing formal basis for the 
assumption of treaty obligations qua treaty obligations. 
From the perspective of de facto quasi-consolidation of the human rights 
treaties as a testing ground for a possible formal consolidation of the com-
mittees, universal ratification is important, although probably not indis-
pensable. It is important because the closer we get to universal ratification of 
all six core treaties, the more easily we can treat the treaties as if they were 
different chapters of the same overall constitutional document and the dif-
ferent human rights committees as if they were chambers of one overall Hu-
man Rights Committee.51 Most significantly from the perspective of cross-
treaty dialogue and cooperation among the committees, any perceived 
problems of formal jurisdictional divisions become less significant in direct 
proportion to the decrease in the number of states who are not party to all 
six treaties.52 At the same time, this evolving unity would be achieved while 
still retaining both the interactive diversity of knowledge of the six commit-
tees' combined membership pool and the ever-present possibility that one 
or more committees can hold out (more or less explicitly) noncooperati9n 
as a way to ensure their treaty's normative focus is taken seriously in the pan-
treaty constitutional order.53 
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CONSOLIDATED STATE REPORTS AND TAILORED STATE REPORTS 
Perhaps the best example of a reform that commends' itself on the basis of 
both efficiency and effectiveness- but which could cut; both ways in terms of 
diversity-would be the consolidation of the current scheme of sending 
separate reports to each committee into a scheme centered on a single 
consolidated report that would address all six treaties and would go to all 
the committees.54 A related issue is the proposal that, while a state's first 
report to any given committee should be comprehensive, its subsequent 
periodic reports to that committee could be made more focused by having 
the committee in question signal well in advance (of the reporting dead-
line) those areas and concerns it wishes to have covered in the state's re-
port.55 It is not difficult to see how the two proposals could converge into a 
single report every five years which would be both consolidated and tailored 
and which could be subject to follow-up scrutiny at the instance of any one 
of the committees in the intervening five years before the next report is due. 
Consolidation and tailoring have been discussed in some detail in the last 
several sessions of the chairpersons. The current position seems to be one 
that is not (at least, not yet) in favor of consolidation but that is in favor of 
' tailoring of periodic reports.56 At the September 1998 meeting, the chair-
persons expressed their collective view in the following terms: 
30. Following the discussion of recent experiences of the respective committees, 
the chairpersons reiterated their view that it was desirable to strive towards focused 
periodic reports, adding that account must be taken of the limited scope of the issues 
covered by some of the treaties. 
31. With regard to the frequently expressed idea of consolidating reports in a 
single global report covering all six human rights treaties, no consensus could be 
reached. As at the eighth meeting, although the chairpersons considered that such 
an approach would reduce the number of different reports requested of States 
·parties and would serve to underline the indivisibility of human rights by ensuring a 
comprehensive analysis of the situation, concerns were expressed in relation to 
problems resulting from different periodicities of reporting under the treaties and, 
· in particular, the risk that the special attention given to groups such as women and 
children would be lost in a single comprehensive report.57 
The consolidated report issue is a prime example of the need for reforms 
to be looked at as a whole so as to ensure that they proceed apace. Adjust-
ments to one reform proposal can provide the necessary correctives to dis-
advantages feared for another. Reporting periodicity is a technical problem 
that, with time, can be easily dealt with. Threats to diversity of focus present 
a more serious concern.58 In the absence of confidence in the other tracks 
of institutional reform, it is reasonable to oppose a single consolidated re-
port in favor of ongoing separate reports to each committee. However, the 
more that institutional integration succeeds in showing that integration not 
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only can but does produce enh an cement of normative analysis (that in-
cludes bringing the human rights perspectives ofless powerful social groups 
to the center of that analysis) and does not produce the feared (re) marginal-
ization of issues dealing with children, racial discrimination, gender d iscrim-
ination, and social and economic d isadvantage, the more compelling will be-
come th e argument for a consolidated pan-treaty report. The achievement 
of a sustained d iversity of experien ce and expertise within the combined 
membership of the six committees will be absolutely crucial for such success 
to be achieved. Also, tailoring of repor ts could h ave positive follow-on effects 
for consolidation; if the committees were collectively to build in principles 
and procedures designed to ensure nonmarginalization, the kinds of issues 
on which the committees choose to request focused repor ting could allevi-
ate concerns that women's rights or the rights of the poor, for instance, will 
necessarily be swamped if the tailored repor ts also become consolidated into 
a single repor t. In this respect, in the way they handle the development of 
tailored reports, the committees are in control of their own destiny with 
respect to the viability and desirability ofrep ort consolidation. 
There is, however, a middle grou nd possibility th at the committees and 
their ch airpersons may wish to consider, perhaps on an experimental basis 
with a number of willing states. As reflected in the above-quoted conclusions 
of the chairperso11s, it is assumed that tailoring would occur only for periodic 
reports, th ose subsequent to the initial postratification report of a state 
party. That initial report would be comprehensive. As for consolidation, the 
chairpersons seem implicitly to be talking about all reports, initial and p eri-
odic. However, conceivably, the proposal for consolidated reports could be 
refined (or clarified) in to a proposal that only periodic reports be consoli-
dated. In this way, each committee would receive a comprehensive first report 
on compliance with its treaty. This approach has the significant benefi t of 
allowing the committee in question (e.g., CEDAW) to develop, as fully as 
possible, a view of the general situation in each state party with respect to all 
the rights in its treaty. Such a view would be invaluable in providing a major 
componen t of the knowledge base on which that committee can then draw 
in the future when considering what tailored questions it wishes to put to 
that state on its consolidated su bsequent report(s) to the committees as a 
whole. A nonconsolidated, nontailored initial report would give each com-
mittee a valuable opportunity to prepare the ground for subsequent more 
focused evaluation of compliance of that state party with the committee's 
treaty within the larger framework of that state's consolidated, tailored peri-
odic report. Producing a comprehensive initial report for each treaty also 
h as educational benefits for that state. Not only will its officiaJs have to 
grapple with the full range of its commitments under each treaty but also 
they will be given the chance to determine for th emselves, based on the com-
mittee's questions and concluding observations, the areas in which there is a 
high likelihood that the committee will wish to focus its scrutiny in future. 
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OVERLAPPING AND COMMON MEETINGS OF THE TREATY BODIES 
It seems obvious that placing the committees in closer proximity would 
assist any efforts at pan-treaty normative dialogue. This means giving consid-
eration to scheduling their meetings in ways that overlap in whole or in 
part. 59 This seems to already be on the agenda in view of a suggestion 
contained in the 1997 follow-up report (to the 1996 chairpersons' meeting) 
·written by the (then) Centre for Human Rights: 
In order to enhance awareness of the work of complementary treaty bodies, it may be 
appropriate to reschedule committee sessions so that some of their meetings overlap, 
for example, the Human Rights Committee with the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; the Human Rights Commit.tee with the Committee against 
Torture; and the Committee on the Rights of the Child with both the Human Rights 
Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 60 
It is important to inject a note of caution 'vith respect to the above phrasing 
by the chairpersons. Every committee has some complementary relationship 
with every other committee and,just as importantly, it is impossible to say in ad-
vance of actual dialogue the nature or extent of such complementarity. In or-
der to facilitate institutional dialogue, the ideal is that a way eventually be 
found for an overlap of the meetings of all six treaty bodies for at least part of 
· one session a year. Furthermore, as is implicit in the subsections which follow, 
an overlap of meeting times should be scheduled not simply in order to facili-
tate parallel meetings but also in order to make possible commonmeetings . 
. COLl.ABORATIVE NORMATIVE PRONOUNCEMENTS: 
GENERAL COMMENTS AND 'JOINT STATEMENTS" 
One obvious objective of cooperation among some or all of the committees 
could be the preparation of general comments that benefit from dialogue 
among the committees. In terms of normative elaboration of the content. of 
rights that would especially benefit from diversity of perspective, there are 
any number of thematic comments that one could envisage, such as the 
example given earlier of a hypothetical general comment on the relation-
ship of social vulnerability to human rights protections. The issue of gender 
is already on the agenda. Presumably, each committee other than CEDAW 
could draft or revise separate general comments on this issue as it pertains 
to its understanding of the rights in its treaty. Or, some overarching general 
comment could be drafted cooperatively by the six committees with each 
committee then having the option to supplement it with a more detailed 
comment that applies, as it were, the common general comment to the 
specifics of its treaty. 61 
Here again the chairpersons have turned their attention to collaborative 
pronouncements. In September 1998 they had the following to say: 
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General comments and the possible use ofjoint statements 
31. The chairpersons took note of the fact that some committees were beginning 
to make reference to the general comments or equivalent statements of other com-
mittees. They encouraged the development of that practice, insofar as the pro-
nouncements of other committees appeared to be relevant and appropriate to the 
situation al hand .... 
36. It was agreed that a new genre of "joint statements" would be an appropriate 
means by which to enable the committees to address issues of common concern with-
out taking such matters to the level of general comments, in relaLion to which joint 
approaches would always be difficult to achieve. Such joint statements would enable 
different treaty bodies Lo work together to address issues of current importance.62 
Only time will tell whether "joint statements" become general comments by 
another n ame or wh ether they will have a normative status that is not at the 
same "level" as general comments. 
Whatever they are called, the advent of collective committee pronounce-
ments is a significan t and welcome development from the perspective of 
normative and institutional integration of the treaty orders. Here it js im-
portant to note that the chairpersons' decision to foster "joint statements" 
was a direct consequence of a concrete proposal put forward at the meeting 
by the CEDAW Chairperson, Salma Illian, on behalf of her committee. The 
proposal was for three committees- CEDAW, along with the HRC and the 
CESCR- to "consider issuing a joint statement on the in divisibility of rights 
and the centrality of gender awareness as part of the fiftieth anniversary 
celebration of the Universal Declaration of Human Right.s."63 Apart from 
endorsing the general concept of "joint statements," th e chairpersons wel-
comed this specific initiative: "Th e chairpersons requested the Division for 
the Advancement of Women to prepare a draft lo be considered by the three 
chairpersons concerned and then to be put to the respective committees."64 
Given its theme, it is not immediately apparent why this first joint state-
ment, was limited to three of th e six committees. Possibly, a strategic deci-
sion was made to .start conservatively and try to secure cooperation on a 
smaller scale rather than encounter logistical difficul ties by involving a11 
six chairpersons. Such coordination difficulties could easily occur given 
that an efficient system of in tercommittee coordination is not yet in place. 
These problems should not be underestimated. When the chairperson of 
the CESCR took the joint statement, as it had been drafted by the chair-
person of CEDAW (and, presumably, found satisfactory by the other two 
chairpersons), to his own committee for its consideration, three CESCR 
committee members made useful co mmen ts about how to improve the joint 
statement.fi5 Given that the committees meet at different times of the year, 
and given that improvements could be suggested by members of all three 
committees, the potential for much delay (and Lime and energy on the part' 
of th e three chairpersons) in coordinating the final statement, agreeable to 
all three committees, is considerable. The CESCR handled the matter with 
considerable institutional magn animity by, in effect, delegating authority to 
'···· 
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their chairperson to produce a final joint comment in consultation with the 
other two chairpersons that would "duly take into account" their views.66 
The final joint statement, as it appears in the o:fficiql ,CESCR records for that 
same session, contains one change from the draft joint statement, namely 
the insertion of a paragraph that seems to represent incorporation of the 
comments which had been made by CESCR member Philippe Texier. 67 
Mention should finally be made of a positive side to having limited the 
joint statement to a subset of the committees, namely that it signals the pos-
sible flexible use of the joint statement in the future. For example, the HRC, 
CAT, and CERD could join in one that seems particularly relevant to their 
combined mandates, such as disproportionate police detention of racial-
ized groups in some countries, leading to a higher risk of torture. While it 
would be undesirable in the long term for themes (such as indivisibility and 
gender awareness) that profoundly involve the mandates of all six commit-
tees to be addressed in a joint statement by fewer than all six, the flexibility 
.. to proceed only with a subset of committees would seem to provide useful 
room for maneuver and experimentation in a transitional period . 
. COORDINATED SCRUTINY OF STATE REPORTS 
Consideration could be given to cooperative scrutiny of state reports, or at 
least of those aspects of the report with respect to which the committees can 
see (or come to see) much overlap and thus many benefits flowing from a 
diversity of committee perspectives. If a given state is due to report to one 
committee at roughly the same time as it is reporting to another (for exam-
ple, Canada reporting to the CESCR and to the HRC within a year of each 
other), the respective committee members in charge of that report could be 
asked to consult and to coordinate questions to be asked of the state.68 
· Common questions could be posed on shared concerns.69 · 
If scheduling permits, one committee's member who is responsible for a 
··· given state can sit in on the report to the other committee and then take that 
· session into account in preparing for the second report. At minimmn, she 
or he can consult the summary records and concluding observations as well 
as discuss with the other committee's member what the second committee 
could most usefully focus on in its dialogue with the state.70 If reporting can 
be coordinated enough to allow a state to be reporting to two corrunittees at 
a time when both committees are meeting in parallel sessions, a decision 
could be made to have the two committees sit in a joint session for the 
relevant parts of the report or indeed for the entire report.71 It is obvious 
enough that this proposal would be most suitable 1.vith respect to states who 
have decided (or been asked as part of an experimental pilot) to submit 
consolidated reports, especially if the practice of tailored reports is also 
adopted for such reports. Tills would combine the benefits ofjoint scrutiny 
with efficiencies produced. by the tjme savings which focused reports should 
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produce as compared to comp rehensive reports. Many of the areas of focus 
for a single tailored report could reflect advance consultation among all the 
committees Lo whom the state is reporting. 
STANDING CROSS-TREATY THEMATIC WORKING GROUPS 
Standing working groups could be set up with a variety of possible tasks, for 
example, to help foster dialogue on general comments which committees 
are considering adopting and on joint statements. One could also envisage 
other kinds of cross-treaty working groups that would be specifically set 
up to discuss and propose committee action on cross-cutting normative 
issues. With the proper support from the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and training of committee members, these groups 
could easily be organized using virtual forms of communication, for in-
stance through Internet website discussion boards or, if not all members 
have access to the Internet, through e-mail listservs. If il were felt that it 
would be useful to reflect on the health rights of girl children, for example, 
a working group could discuss this theme, acting as a kind of think tank for 
the committees as a whole. If a common period of meeting time for the six 
committees were scheduled and dedicated for intercornmittee work and 
reflection, these working groups could sometimes meet in person in order 
to pursue discussions, draft proposals that would go to the respective com-
mittees, and produce integrated texts (reports, joint statements, and so on) 
once all committees have made their input. 
OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP 
One of the most direct ways to foster an inter-treaty dynamic would be to 
create a situation whereby a number of committee members are elected to 
more than one committee. One treaty, CAT, already expressly provides for 
the desirability of crossover membership as a consideration for election to 
its committee.72 There should, accordingly, be no legal problem with over-
lapping membership on a wider scale within the human rights treaty system 
given that the express provision im CAT for shared membership with the 
Human Rights Committee was not viewed as third-party regulation of the 
ICCPR. All that would be required would be for states themselves to cre-
ate overlap through their nomination and voting practice.73 Each member 
elected to more than one committee would be a member of each. 
There are any number of reasons why overlapping membership would be 
fruitful from the perspective of inter-treaty dialogue. The basic point would 
be that overlapping membership would to some extent ensure that human 
rights issues are examined by each committee from a broader perspective 
than tends to be the case when the sole mandate of every committee mem-
ber is one treaty text. One could contemplate any number of axes. For 
" :., 
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example, a person who is a member of both CERD and CEDAW should be 
institutionally disposed to inject intersectional issues of race and gender 
into the deliberations of each committee. 
Such shared committee members would in many ways be encouraged to 
act in a fashion that is a classic example of Georges SceIJe's dedoublement 
Jonctionnel or "double functioning. "74 Scelle's notion was meant to describe 
international lawyers, notably legal advisers to states, who have to be nor-
matively faithful both to domestic law and international law, both to the 
national interest and to the common international interest. In the process, 
the person who must function in such a double capacity not only becomes 
skilled at translating one system oflegal thought and practice into the terms 
of the other, but also becomes skilled at mediating the two systems in ways 
that produce an integrated perspective different from, while still faithful to, 
both. In the same way, a member of two (or more) human rights committees 
·· would have dual (or multiple) normative loyalties which would have to be 
translated and mediated. In this way, the committee members in question 
would come to embody a dialogue of treaty texts and the associated norma-
tive mandates of those texts. 
In relation to the consolidation process, should it ever be desired, a grad-
ual increase in overlapping membership could serve a second function. It 
could become the primary mechanism whereby de facto consolidation of 
the six treaty bodies takes place without the need for any formal treaty 
amendments. By the end of the process, if perfectly coordinated by states in 
electing the committees (admittedly a remote possibility without a parallel 
understanding being reached among states that would solve the collective 
action problems), the total number of committee members would be re-
duced from the current 97 to 23, which is the number of members on the 
largest committee (CEDAW). All 10 members of the smallest two commit-
tees, CAT and the CRC, would also be members of all five other committees. 
As for the remaining three committees comprised of 18 members each, 
there would be a buffer of five CEDAW members (23 minus 18) which would 
allow some members of the HRC, CESCR, and CERD not to be members of 
one or more of the other three committees and/ or allow some members of 
CEDAW (statistically, up to five) to be members only of CEDAW. 
Benefits of Interactive Integration in Relation to the 
Next Genemtion of Monitoring Challenges 
The foregoing institutional reform suggestions have been schematic. They 
also probably fall toward the least creative end of a continuum of reform 
possibilities, but, for that reason, they also represent practical possibilities. 
In the various reform studies underway at the UN, these and kindred pro-
posals can presumably be scrutinized with a view to assessing their feasibility 
as well as elaborating them and sharpening their focus. 
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What remains to be done in this chapter is to provide a series of concrete 
examples of how the gradual enhancement of interactive diversity of knowl-
edge through institutional integration of the human rights committees can 
contribute to the perceptive analysis of the types of human rights problems 
which the UN human rights order must begin - soon - to get its collective 
mind around. The following examples are purely illustrative and are vir-
tually randomly chosen. No claim is being made that they represent all the 
types of next-generation challenges posed for international human rights 
monitoring, although an effort has been made to identify the key ones. 
STRUCTURAL SCRUTINY AND PREVENTIVE REMEDIES 
An inevitable feature of the monitoring methods of the treaty bodies has 
been their reactive nature. That is to say, they by and large look at what 
has already transpired and pass judgment on whether noncompliance with 
treaty norms has taken place. However, the state report procedure does -
increasingly-have a forward-looking element Lo the extent that the com-
mittees offer recommendations about how structural failures can be rem-
edied. With each passing year, such structural-reform recommendations 
become more clearly and incisively formulated, al least by several of the 
committees (notably the CESCR, CRC, and CEDAW). Another way, then, of 
looking at such structural assessments of past con du.ct is in terms of their 
potentially far-reaching preventive function: if carried out, future human 
rights violations should be avoided. Ideally, the committees must begin to 
address more directly that aspect of state responsibility which requires states 
not just to prevent specific harms (notably harms of some nonstate actors by 
other nonstate actors) that arc reasonably foreseeable, but also to organize 
the entire apparatus of government in such a way that human rights viola-
tions are approached as something to avoid and not simply something to 
repair.75 
Structural scrutiny and associated preventive remedies involve far-reach-
ing inquiries into the interconnectedness of causes and obstacles. OfLen 
enough, no small degree of complexity is involved. As such, the benefits of 
more integrated normative analysis facilitated by interactive institutionalism 
among the human rights committees would seem obvious. To illustrate this 
claim, consider that treaty which most people would, at first blush, see as 
benefiting the least from a quasi-consolidation of the treaty order due to its 
seemingly narrow focus: the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Yet a Com-
~ittee Against Torture that focused only or almost exclusively on what goes 
on within jail cells and (para) military torture chambers would be missing 
much that is relevant to torture prevention, even if sophisticated procedural 
safeguards and mechanisms are necessary ways to prevent torture from oc-
curring in these locales. Here I am assuming that the will to torture is in Li-
mately connected to the human capacity to dehumanize and to power struc-
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tures that nurture and actively exploit this capacity. Take race: how does 
racism interact with creation and mobilization of the will to torture? Just 
'asking this question is enough to point out how an :interface between CAT 
and CERD should deepen understanding of the·" othering" conditions that 
promote torture.76 It would be a two-way street if CAT were to use its con-
crete focus to produce analyses of how structures of racial and ethnic preju-
dice fuel torture; CERD could then work with these concrete insights in 
order to assist, in some dialectical manner, its understanding of the larger 
phenomena that produce the conditions for racial discrimination. Similar 
interactive advantages could emerge from CESCR-CAT cooperation to the 
extent that the poor may be hypothesized to be the rnost vulnerable to 
'certain kinds of torture (notably the "casual" police beating) and to recruit-
ment as the frontline instruments of torture. And when it comes to rape in 
the context of genocide or ethnocide, CAT and CERD would be less likely to 
see the gendered dimensions as clearly as they might if CEDAW's perspec-
tives were actively in play (rape as torture and rape-torture as an instrument 
of genocide). And, beyond these examples, the whole question of the struc-
tural dimensions of torture and the preventive measures necessary to modify 
those structures intimately involves perhaps the most structure-influencing 
of all human rights: the right to education. AB phrased in international hu-
man rights in~truments, the right to education is nonneutral regarding hu-
man rights values.77 CAT analysis which does not explore education's links to 
torture would be inadequate from a structural-preventive perspective.78 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPLIED RIGHTS PROTECTIONS 
It is generally not controversial that rights may be implied even if not ex-
pressly provided for in a text. For example, as noted earlier, the Human 
Rights Committee has implied rights related to health and housing into the 
ICCPR "right to life. "79 Another example is of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights reading a (conditional) right to civil legal aid into the right to a 
fair trial.80 A full list of existing doctrinal examples would be quite long. 
However, the tendency is to conceive of the process of implication in 
terms of a given contended-for right. For example, when in Johnston v. Ire-
land the applicants claimed (unsuccessfully) that the right to divorce was 
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, they relied on a 
·series of specific articles in turn: article 12 (the right to marry), article 8 (the 
right to family life), and article 14 (the right to nondiscrimination in rela-
tion to other protected rights). 81 They did not rely on all three rights in 
combination to argue for the implied right. Or, if they did argue in this 
more holistic way, the court did not understand their argument in this way. 
Rather, the· court examined each article in turn, starting with article 12's 
right to marry. 
An alternative way to proceed when assessing whether a right should or 
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should not be implied into a treaty is to look at the issue in terms of th.e 
treaty as a whole being the normative touchstone rather than the specific 
r ights in seriatim. The UN Charter provides an interesting analogy. The 
peacekeeping powers of the General Assembly have often been treated less 
as having been implied into powers already set out in chapter 4 of the 
Charter and more as having been imagined as an entirely new chapter 
located between chapters 6 and 7- "chapter 6lA!." That is, they have been 
systemically implied on the basis of the over-all scheme and purposes of the 
Charter. On such an approach, implied rights may be found not only in 
given rights but also between given rights and in the combined interstitial zones 
of the entire treaty understood as a system of values and interests.82 
An example of when such an argument has been employed may help. In 
the case of Baher v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Irnrnigration), decided 
in July 1999 by the Supreme Court of Canada, one issue was whether the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child protects a child's right not to have 
the child's parent deported from the child's state of nationality.83 No provi-
sion in the CRC sets out such a right in explicit terms, but two provisions 
surround the contended-for right. The key provisions within articles 9 and 
10 read as follows: 
Article 9 
1. States Parties shall ensure that a child not be separated from his or her parents 
against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review deter-
mine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is 
necessary for the best interests of the child .... 
Articl,e 10 
1. In accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, 
applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the 
purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, 
humane and expeditious manner .... 
To say that these provisions "surround" the right not to have parents de-
ported is to say that neither one of them on its own was completely adequate 
to the task of serving as the basis of the irnpliedright (a child's right that her 
or his best interests be given great weight in deciding whether a parent may 
be deported) that was being argued for. It is with this difficulty in mind that 
one intervenor in Baker, the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), 
argued that, while neither article 9 nor article 10 is fully apposite when 
looked at individually, their combined effect is a different story- especially 
when article 3 of the treaty is taken into account.84 At one point, the CCPI 
factum refers to the oblique approach adopted by the CRC, as part of CCPI's 
attempt to interpretively combine articles 3, 9, and 10: 
28. The Committee on the Right'> of the Child has interpreted articles 9 and 10 as 
together recognizing a right of children not to have their parents deported. In 1995, 
the Committee expressed its regret that "refugee or immigrant children born in 
Canada may be separated from their parents facing a deportation order." The Com-
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mittee also urged that "Solutions should also be sought to avoid expulsions causing 
the separation of families, in the spirit of article 9 of the Convention. "85 
When paragraph 28 of the CCPI factum refers to artides 9 and 10 "inter-
preted together," CCPI is in effect saying that the putative implied right lies 
., neither entirely within article 9 nor entirely within article 10. The implied 
right is justified by viewing the two rights as a mini-system. Put another way, 
the CRC is looked at as a system whose purposes and textual signals allow for 
interstitial interpretation such that there should be recognized an implied 
. right between article 9 and article 10-an "article 9112," as it were. 
··· This CRC interpretive example helps make clear how viewing the six 
· treaties as an evolving constitutional whole and the committees as chambers 
of an integrated institution could produce a much richer tapestry of rights 
than is possible if each treaty is looked at on its own and if each committee 
goes about its work in isolation from the others. This is especially the case 
when we consider the argument that we should constantly draw on the 
fundamental interests that human rights are meant to protect and thereby 
engage in interpretation that is more holistic and purposive as opposed to 
categorical and (unduly) text-bound.86 Not only would interpretation of the 
spaces between rights within a given treaty (as between articles 9 and 10 of 
the CRC) be conducted in light of the normative cocoon provided by the 
other five treaties but also we could begin to talk about implied rights in the 
interstitial zones between treaties themselves. 
HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE DIAGONAL: B ETWEEN DRITTWIRH.UNG 
AND I NDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY 
"Diagonality" (see Figure 3) attempts to capture the idea of (both concep-
tual and institutional) joinder of the state and relevant private actors in 
human rights scrutiny.87 Diagonality looks at human rights in terms of fields 
of responsibility and power relations that engage the conduct (both acts 
and omissions) of state and nonstate sectors simultaneously, and then links 
that analysis to appropriate allocation of both legal responsibility and cre-
ative (including joint) remedies. Diagonality analysis offers possibilities for 
rights-based scrutiny that are more structural and comprehensive than is 
possible according to a stark either I or division of the applicability of rights 
into the categories "horizontal" versus "vertical." Rights relations are verti-
cal if they involve the obligation of a governing actor (notably the state) to-
ward nonstate actors and horizontal if they involve the claim that rights are 
applicable in the "private" sector relations between nonstate actors (an axis 
of applicability which German legal theory has labeled as drittwirkung) .88 
It may be' a long time before the committees are recognized as having the 
implied power to directly scrutinize the activities of private actors given 
the very state-centered (vertical) orientation of the human rights treaty 
32 Craig Scott 
HORIZONTAL OBLIGATION 
Figure 3. Diagonality vectors representing possible appor-
tionment of shared legal responsibility between public and 
private actors. 
regimes. However, it is a given that the indirect rewonsibility of states places 
increasingly onerous obligations on them to regulate the private sector, 
especially corporate activity given the concentration of power and potential 
for harm represented by many companies. 89 Within the analysis of the indi-
rect responsibility of states parties to the treaties, it may become desirable 
for the committees to request that states provide detailed information on 
the conduct of all companies in given sectors or even on specified corpora-
tions- and perhaps even request that states require companies themselves 
to prepare reports on conduct which affects some or all of the treaty norms. 
Without actually joining the nonstate actors (for want of the formal jurisdic-
tional nexus on which to do so), the committees could still "notionally" join 
those actors so as to be able to assess the remedial measures they should 
recommend to states, including the measures they recommend states take 
vis-a-vis corporations. In a range of situations, the committees could inter-
pret the indirect responsibility of the state to be engaged if it does not 
regulate certain nonstate actors, notably corporations, in such a way as to 
place those actors under direct obligations in domestic law to protect cer-
tain human rights. With time, one could even foresee the committees en-
couraging the voluntary appearance of some nonstate actors before the 
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The not.ion of diagonality may not itself provide a strong reason for insti-
tuticmal interaction among the committees. Rather, it seems only to piggy-
back on the other reasons for integration already canvassed. However, diag-
onality analysis would seem more achievable in.a situation of institutional 
integration than in one of institutional isolation. The polycentricity quo-
tient of human rights analysis can be expected to go up in diagonality situa-
tions where the competing or complementary rights and duties of different 
persons are being openly addressed. For example, if diagonality analysis un-
der the CRC were to suggest that all schools should be responsible for pre-
venting or repairing certain harms to children (whether or not the schools 
are state, private, or hybrid), then certain rights of parent.s, as found for 
example in the ICESCR or the ICCPR, become relevant to the analysis. 
Further, if there are reasons to think that placing certain kinds of financially 
onerous duties on schools will disproportionately affect specific groups such 
as residentially clustered racial minorities or single mothers, then CERD 
and CEDAW must be brought into the foreground of the picture. 
Another example is brought to mind by the discussion of child support 
obligations under article 27 of the CRC in Martha Shaffer's contribution to 
this volume (see Chapter 7). For ease of reference, the relevant portions of 
ar ticle 27 are reproduced below: 
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for 
the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. 
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility 
to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living 
necessary for the child's development. 
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, 
shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child 
to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and 
support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition , clothing and housing. 
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of mainte-
nance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility 
for the child, both within the State Party and from. abroad .... 
Article 27 is one of the rare examples of diagonality found on the surface of 
a treaty text. While article 27(2) places a "primary responsibility" on par-
ents to secure "the conditions of living necessary for the child's develop-
ment/' the state h as, by article 27(3), general residual duties (a) to assist 
parents in ensuring an adequate standard of living for their children and 
(b) to carry out a classic "social and economic rights" function by "in the 
case of need[] provid [ing] material assistance and support programmes, 
particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing." 
Of interest in the present example is the relationship between this latter 
duty and the quite specific recovery duty in th e first sentence of article 
27 ( 4). Shaffer's coverage of the situation in Ontario reveals that this Cana-
dian province appears to have done much on the side of horizontal respon-
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sibility for child support. Not only are a range of adult actors caught by 
duties to provide child maintenance but also a special enforcement unit has 
been formed to step in to force a delinquent (separated or divorced) parent 
to pay court-ordered support payments. Especially as the bulk of persons 
seeking to enforce support obligations for the care of their children are 
women, this recent law reform can be viewed as simultaneously combining 
gains in children's rights and in women's rights. 
However, assume as a hypothetical that the Ontario regime does not 
address, qua child support regime, the transitional period between the 
default on the support payments and their eventual recovery by the state's 
enforcement unit. In that period, the custodial parent may have to turn to 
social assistance. Now assume that the custodial parent may, in some bureau-
cratic twist, have trouble being accepted as eligible for social assistance until 
she proves that she has done all she can do to recover the money from the 
defaulting former spouse. This problem would be easily rectifiable by re-
quiring the state to issue a certificate that would attest to the fact that the 
state has taken carriage of the recovery efforts and which would be recog-
nized by social assistance authorities; a seamlessness would thereby be cre-
ated between the child support regime and the safety net of the social 
assistance regime. 
Yet, assume a second problem that cannot so easily disappear through 
better public/private documentation coordination, namely, that the social 
assistance rate is likely to be a lesser rate than the support award. The 
existence of such a disparity in income would suggest that the state, on these 
assumed facts, has gone too far toward the horizontal end of the field of 
responsibility. Both gender and child-centered diagonality analyses suggest 
that a state must, in the transitional period, assume responsibility to con-
tinue the support payments rather than leave the shortfall and add to the 
burden on the mother (by virtue of having to try to access a separate state 
bureaucracy each and every time the separated or divorced spouse defaults 
on child support payments). That is to say, in these circumstances, it is the 
last clause of article 27(3) that should indicate the necessary axis of respon-
sibility. The state's duty to fulfill, as a secondary duty within article 27's 
structure, kicks in. The state may of course recover the amount paid for the 
transitional period from the defaulting spouse, but it should not be able to 
use that spouse's primary responsibility as an excuse to avoid its own duty to 
provide material assistance and support directly "in the case of need. "90 
Furthermore, it takes little effort to see how the effects of a transitional gap 
are. exacerbated to the extent that the state has also adopted policies of 
privatized responsibility across the range of governmental spheres, includ-
ing by maintaining social assistance rat.es at levels that independently violate 
the duty to avoid and eliminate child poverty. The CESCR's scrutiny of the 
general (in) adequacy of the state support for economically disadvantaged 
.... .. 
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children and families would thus be a needed third point in a triangle of 
scrutiny that the CRC, CEDAW, and CESCR could collectively carry out. 
INDIRECT EXTRA TERRITORIAL RESPONSIBILITY . 
Indirect state responsibility has been touched upon above, and mention has 
been made of the special need for regulation of corporate activity in the 
name of human rights. As economic globalization spreads and deepens, the 
time is already upon us when the committees should be considering diago-
nality across borders. The problematic activity especially of overseas oil and 
mining companies has become a matter of general knowledge and concern 
in recent years; for example, the conduct of Unocal in Burma and Texaco in 
... ·· Ecuador has resulted in human rights tort litigation in the courts of the 
United States.91 The question is: How far should the UN human rights 
system move toward positive duties on home states of corporations to pro-
tect persons in other states from harms caused either by transnational enter-
.. prises (TNEs) or by TNEs in association with the foreign state? Here "home 
.· state" is used broadly to cover states in which companies are incorporated or 
otherwise have a meanirigful presence, such as being the site of the head 
office or regional decision-making office. 
Immediately, of course, the issue of extraterritoriality comes up. It is one 
··· thing to hold a state responsible for human rights harm that its own agents 
·cause abroad. 92 Many would view it as quite another thing to extend respon-
sibility to states for failing to regulate private actors that cause the harm. 
This is not the occasion to take a position on the larger issues involved in 
· placing indirect extraterritorial responsibiJi ty on states other than to say 
that at minimum some state responsibility (however it ends up being appor-
tioned between home states and host states) is, as an empirical matter, nec-
essary if transnational corporate conduct is not to continue to fall between 
the normative cracks of globalization. One area in which there already 
seems to be emergent consensus on home state responsibility to regulate 
activity of nationals abroad in the name of human rights is with respect to 
child sex tourism. V\lhile most responses, in countries like Australia and 
Canada, have been to criminalize the individual conduct of the (ab) users of 
child prostitutes, it is arguably inadequate if those countries do not also 
regulate the commercial, and consequent mass-tourism, dimension of travel 
for sex with children by making it contrary to the law for travel agencies, 
airlines, and others knowingly to facilitate such tomism. When a leading 
international lawyer based in a sovereignty-sensitive country like Singapore 
goes on record as arguing for such extended extraterritorial responsibility, 
there is good reason to believe that transnational regulation of child sex 
tourism may well prove to be the Trojan horse for a new paradigm of extra-
territorial human rights responsibility.93 
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Take the norm of nondiscrimination as a further. example. This is a norm 
that the human rights treaty bodies have long made clear places positive 
duties on states with respect to private sector discrimination within their 
own states.94 Thus, for example, a country like Japan is under treaty obliga-
tions to regulate sex discrimination in private workplaces. Assume the fol-
lowing seemingly fanciful factsY5 Mitsubishi Corporation, a Japanese com-
pany, places advertisements in Japanese newspapers that seek to market 
Mitsubishi's heavy duty air conditioners by using a double entendre on the 
idea of "air service." The ads feature a Japanese Airlines (JAL) pilot who is 
asked an ambiguous question about whether he slept in a room with air 
conditioning or with one of the (female) JAL cabin crew. The union for JAL 
pilots launch a protest campaign that includes writing to Mitsubishi to com-
plain that the ad "stereotyped and denigrated the cabin crew profession."96 
After the company dismissed the complaint out of hand, the union ap-
proached the Japanese prime minister's office and thus placed the issue on 
the political agenda. No formal action was taken but, within two weeks, 
Mitsubishi had agreed to retract the discriminatory ad and to issue a formal 
apology that was published in full-page ads in four Japanese newspapers and 
also aired via the broadcast media. 
What if neither Mitsubishi nor Japan had acted in response to the com-
plaints and, furthermore, what if there existed no legislative avenue for 
the JAL employees to seek legal redress for discriminatory treatment by 
their employer? The non discrimination jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee and of the CESCR (where workplace discrimination is even 
more central to the treaty's mandate) would clearly be applicable, and 
Japan's duty to permit freedom of (corporate) expression would be squarely 
up against the right of female employees not to be discriminated against. 
Now, assume - crucially for this example - that the above-described events 
occurred in Thailand, not Japan. The Mitsubishi ad used Thai Airways em-
ployees, not Japan Airlines employees; the ads were placed in Thai not 
Japanese newspapers; and it was the Thai Prime Minister's office that became 
involved. These three modifications align the example with the facts.97 As 
such, the fictionalized situation (all material facts taking place in Japan) is 
transformed into a situation of extraterritorial responsibility of Japan for 
Japanese corporate conduct abroad. In asking whether the treaty nondis-
crimination norms should require Japan to regulate Mitsubishi's conduct in 
Thailand no differently than its conduct in Japan, the analysis would clearly 
benefit from the interactive insights of a number of the committees both on 
the .desirable content of the nondiscrimination norm and on the larger 
international law question of the extraterritorial scope of human rights 
treaties. Not only would CEDA\.Y, the HRC, and the CESCR have direct 
contributions to make, but so also would CERD for whom the central ques-
tion would be whether Mitsubishi had racialized the Thai women (especially 
were it to turn out that no such ads run in Japan or that the ads that run in 
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Japan also use Thai employees and not Japanese employees). Quite beyond 
the substantive benefits of institutional interaction among the committees, 
any decision to move toward a paradigm of indirect extraterritorial respon-
sibility for transnational corporate conduct would ·h~ve its auth ority en-
hanced significantly if it could be presented as a decision taken by a11 six 
committees in their shared perception that they should promote the evolu-
tion of a global constitutional order centered on the UN human rights 
treaties rather than as a decision of one or two committees who could be 
condemned by states as acting outside their mandate. 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL MONITORING: ACCOUNTA.l:HIJTY OF 
INTERSTAT E GOVERNING .INSTITUTIONS AND REGIMES 
The preceding section ended by broaching the subject of global constitu-
tionalism, but global constitutionalism in the context of th e world's evolving 
political economy cannot rest conten t with a focus only on apportioning 
slate responsibility and on seeking Lo develop some indirect monitoring of 
transnational corporate conduct. All governing actors and all governance regi,mes 
within the global(izing) order must also eventually be accounted for in the 
evolution of the normative functions and authority of the UN human rights 
committees. Much concern is already being directed in contemporary so-
cial and political discourse to the problems of (lack of) human rights ac-
countability of international financial institutions (IFis) such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, for the devastating 
consequences of recent UN Security Council activity notably in respect of 
sanctions regimes such as that maintained on Iraq, and on the lack of a 
human rights counterbalance to the rapidly solidifying hegemony of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) regime. To date, the human rights treaty 
bodies cannot be said to have more than hinted at how they conceptualize 
their authority to monitor these interstate institutions and rcgimes.98 
But it is safe to say, I think, that both ideas and inLercommittee solidarity 
must begin to be generated through a collective articulation of a legal the-
ory of governance responsibility (as contrasted to the traditional, and ongoing, 
focus on "state responsibility") according to which stales arc no more per-
mitted to escape human rights accountability by configuring governance 
through delegation to the interstate level than they should be allowed to 
shed human rights through delegation by privatization.99 Given that inter-
national organizations and treaty regimes generally retain, at the formal 
juridical level, their state-cenlcredness, there should- ultimately- be little 
doubt about the legitimacy of the human rights committees beginning to 
address state conduct that lakes interstate forms. At minimum, normative 
pronouncements on human righls violations committed by, for example, 
the IMF or the Security Council can be presented as preconditions to con-
clusions about the st.ate responsibility of the states that are members and 
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decision makers in those institutions. A capacity to focus on global struc-
tures and on the human rights obligations of multiple actors represents a 
possible constitutional future for the UN human rights treaty system, a 
future that will only be possible if the current fragmented treaty order 
comes increasingly to be recognized as an integrated (normative and in-
stitutional) whole. The trick will be for the UN human rights treaty order lo 
finesse its own state-centered formal foundations as it moves toward this new 
state of affairs. 
